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Abstract  
Organizations developing safety-critical software are increasingly seeking to create better practices by meshing 
agile and plan-driven development processes. Significant differences between the agile and the plan-driven 
processes make meshing difficult, and very little empirical evidence on using agile processes for safety-critical 
software development exists. There are four areas of concern, in particular, for meshing the development of safety-
critical software concerning: documentation, requirements, life cycle and testing. We report on a case study of a 
pharmaceutical organization in which a Scrum process was implemented to support agile software development in 
a plan-driven safety-critical project. The purpose was to answer the following research question: For safety-critical 
software, what can a software team do to mesh agile and plan-driven processes effectively? The main contribution 
of the paper is an elaborated understanding of meshing in the four areas of concern and how the conditions for 
safety-critical software influence them. We discuss how meshing within the four areas of concern is a contribution 
to existing research. 
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1 Introduction 
Safety-critical software products are increasing in numbers and complexity. They are found in several domains, 
and they affect the everyday life of people. A few examples of safety-critical products are digital insulin pumps, 
railway signalling, airbags, elevator controls, self-driving cars and flight controls (Abdelaziz et al. 2015; 
Rasmussen et al. 2009). Though the advantages of these devices are great, the safety risks involved cannot be 
ignored as failure may have severe consequences, such as loss of life. The safety risks have led to the 
institutionalization of approval procedures and certification, and as a consequence, the development of safety-
critical products and software is highly regulated. For example, medical devices in the USA must be approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (U. S. Department of Health 2010), and the EN 50128 is a European 
standard for the development of railway applications (Jonsson et al. 2012; Myklebust and Stålhane 2018). Similar 
agencies are authorized in other areas and other countries to approve and certify safety-critical products. To the 
untrained eye, there seems to be a generic waterfall model underlying these standards, leading to traditional plan-
driven approaches to software development.  
The plan-driven models do not work well in general software development when requirements change and when 
users, marketing executives, managers and developers inevitably acquire new knowledge during the stages of 
development. That is a significant shortcoming of the plan-driven model (Boehm and Turner 2005; Cockburn 
2006; Kuhrman et al. 2017). Also, in the development of safety-critical software, changes are inevitable despite 
thorough analysis (Beznosov 2003), and requirements change or additional requirements emerge during 
development (Rasmussen et al. 2009). While several  agile development processes have existed for some years 
(Cockburn 2006; Conboy 2009), a large number of software organizations have implemented agile processes such 
as Scrum (Schwaber and Beedle 2001). Within organizations which are developing safety-critical software, there 
is a marked interest in the agile processes, and several have implemented elements of the agile processes 
(McCaffery et al. 2016; Notander et al. 2013a). 
Research indicates that agile processes can work well under regulatory requirements (McHugh et al. 2014b) and 
that safety-critical software can be developed using an agile process, (e.g. Abdelaziz et al. 2015; Van 
Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker 2018). The research literature shows that organizations use a variety of elements 
of agile processes while developing safety-critical software (Heeager and Nielsen, 2018), and surveys show how 
several organizations have experimented with agile development of safety-critical software (McCaffery et al. 2016; 
Notander et al. 2013a). However, to fulfil the regulatory requirements while using agile processes, the development 
processes need to be tailored for this specific purpose (e.g. Fitzgerald et al. 2013; Myklebust and Stålhane 2018). 
In this article, we address a particular case company, and we document what a software team has done to mesh 
agile and plan-driven development processes. Here, we have taken meshing as the common term for mixing, 
integrating and coexisting. The case study software team developed software for a safety-critical medical device 
while being embedded within a much larger device project that was highly plan-driven. The product, as a whole, 
was required to be compliant with the FDA standards, and the case demonstrates both the difficulty with some 
aspects of meshing and the ease of other aspects. 
The objective of the research was to provide empirical evidence and to analyse the case data on the following 
research question:  
 
For safety-critical software, what can a software team do to mesh agile and plan-driven processes effectively?  
 
In Section 2, the related research on meshing in safety-critical software development is presented, and the areas 
of concern in which the agile and the plan-driven processes need to mesh are discussed. The research design of the 
case study is described in Section 3. The case organization is presented and the software team’s practices are 
described in Section 4. The case study analysis is presented in Section 5, supported by empirical evidence from 
qualitative interviews. The contributions derived from the findings are discussed in Section 6, and the conclusions 
are described in Section 7. 
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2 Agility in Safety-Critical Software Development 
In this paper, we use the following definition of agility: “the continual readiness of an ISD [information systems 
development] method to rapidly or inherently create change, proactively or reactively embrace change, and learn 
from change while contributing to perceived customer value (economy, quality, and simplicity), through its 
collective components and relationships with its environment” (Conboy 2009, p. 340). Embracing change and 
customer value is central to the agile processes; any attempt to apply agile processes when developing safety-
critical software must accommodate this, one way or the other.  
It is often required in standards and approval procedures that development follows a documented and rigid 
process (Heeager and Nielsen 2018), and that this occurs at the outset is mostly in line with plan-driven software 
development; thus, for a long time, agility was considered at odds with safety-critical software that can cause 
serious injury to people, the environment or the economy. Several studies have engaged in the question of whether 
agile processes can be used when developing safety-critical software; the majority are studies comparing an agile 
process, such as Scrum or XP, with a certain regulatory standard (e.g. Beznosov and Kruchten 2004; Mehrfard et 
al. 2010; Wäyrynen et al. 2004; Özcan-Top and McCaffery 2019), but some scattered empirical studies also do 
exist (e.g. Bedoll 2003; Fitzgerald et al. 2013; Grenning 2001; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008). The literature shows 
that agile processes in their original form do not comply with regulatory requirements for safety-critical software 
development, and thus adaptations to the agile processes are needed. In line with this, some papers have suggested 
modified agile processes, for example, Stålhane et al. (2012) who proposed the Safe Scrum, (Boström et al. (2006) 
who proposed an extended XP and Hajou et al. (2015b) who proposed a method, called æ, which was tailored for 
the pharmaceutical industry. However, more empirical evidence of the challenges and the approach that can be 
taken is needed.   
In practice, compliance between agile development and safety-critical development can be done by meshing; 
meshing will conceptually entail that the agile and plan-driven ideas and processes are mixed when they can 
coexist, balanced against each other when one is dominating the other and merged when they can integrate 
seamlessly. The mixing, balancing and merging of software processes, parts of processes and process components 
we refer to as meshing. A prominent example of meshing is the work of Boehm and Turner (2005) in which they 
develop and describe several dimensions all of which are important for software development in general.  
In a recent systematic literature review, of 51 articles published in leading journals and conferences, four areas 
of concern for agile processes when developing safety-critical software were found (Heeager and Nielsen 2018): 
• Light documentation: While the agile processes depend on face-to-face communication and informal 
coordination over documentation of knowledge, safety-critical software development relies on 
formalized processes based on documentation. 
• Flexible requirements in user stories: Agile processes advocate changeability in requirements and a less 
formal specification. In safety-critical development, changes pose challenges to the documentation, and 
the documentation of the requirements must be done formally. 
• Iterative and incremental life cycle: Agile processes suggest an iterative life cycle to facilitate learning 
and adoption. In safety-critical software, development stability is prioritized, and the development 
follows a sequential life cycle. 
• Test-first processes: Agile processes rely on test-driven development and iterative automated testing. In 
safety-critical development, the testing is done as the final phases of the project, and instead of test-
driven development, detailed test plans are conducted. 
These are the four areas of concern within which we investigated the meshing of agile and plan-driven processes. 
For each area of concern, we added the method, the key experience and the recommendations of Van 
Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker (2018), who have applied agile principles to developing medical devices. Table 
1 summarizes the challenges within each area of concern presented in the literature, as well as the suggestions for 
meshing the two processes.   
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Table 1 Challenges and meshing approach for each area of concern 
Area of concern Challenges Meshing approach 
The use of 
documentation 
1. Providing the appropriate amount and the 
right kind of documentation for proving the 
safety of the software (Gary et al. 2011; 
Hajou et al. 2015a; Sidky and Arthur 2007; 
Wäyrynen et al. 2004) 
2. Handling change management and 
maintaining traceability (Drobka et al. 
2004; Kasauli et al. 2018; McHugh et al. 
2014a; McHugh et al. 2014b; Notander et 
al. 2013a; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008; 
Sidky and Arthur 2007) 
• Treat documentation as part of the product 
requested by the customer (McHugh et al. 
2012) 
• Consider the purpose of the 
documentation and only provide what is 
required (Grenning 2001; Misra et al. 
2010) 
• Produce the documentation before 
development, but cumulatively (Van 
Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker 2018) 
• Treat the documentation as a separate 
activity during each iteration (Stålhane et 
al. 2012) 
• Use sub-teams in charge of documentation 
(Paige et al. 2008) 
Engineering 
requirements 
1. Achieving flexible requirements and 
maintaining traceability (Bedoll 2003; 
Boström et al. 2006; Drobka et al. 2004; 
Ge et al. 2010; Notander et al. 2013a; 
Notander et al. 2013b; Rasmussen et al. 
2009) 
2. Documenting the requirements in user 
stories (Górski and Łukasiewicz 2013; 
Jonsson et al. 2012) 
• Separate functional and safety 
requirements (in the beginning) (Ge et al. 
2010; Stålhane et al. 2012; Van 
Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker 2018) 
• User stories should supplement the formal 
requirements (two types) (Boström et al. 
2006; Demissie et al. 2016) 
• Modify user stories to include risks (Hajou 
et al. 2015b; Kasauli et al. 2018) 
• Use safety stories (Myklebust and 
Stålhane 2018) 
Life cycle 1. Managing iterative changes (Beznosov 
2003; Beznosov and Kruchten 2004; 
Jonsson et al. 2012; Notander et al. 2013a; 
Van Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker 
2018) 
2. Iterative validation of the software 
(Kasauli et al. 2018; Paige et al. 2008; 
Wang et al. 2017; Wang and Wagner 
2018) 
 
• Conduct the safety analysis iteratively, but 
validate the software incrementally 
(Kasauli et al. 2018) 
• Treat change management in documents 
iteratively and incrementally (Notander et 
al. 2013a; Van Schooenderwoert and 
Shoemaker 2018) 
• Use new validation techniques such as  
System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) or a combination of STPA and  
Behavior-Driven Development (BDD) 
(Wang et al. 2017; Wang and Wagner 
2018) 
• Use stepwise integration instead of 
continuous integration (Myklebust and 
Stålhane 2018) 
Testing 1. Changing the practice from testing in the 
final stages to iterative testing (McCaffery 
et al. 2016; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008) 
2. Roles related to testing conflicts in agile 
vs safety regulations (Jonsson et al. 2012) 
3. Heavy iterative testing of the software 
increments (Kasauli et al. 2018; Rottier 
and Rodrigues 2008) 
• Use longer iterations to include testing and 
validation (Rasmussen et al. 2009; Rottier 
and Rodrigues 2008) 
• Use automated, risk-based, continuous 
testing (Kasauli et al. 2018) 
5 
 
2.1 The Use of Documentation 
 
The use of documentation of safety-critical software gets much attention in the research literature as it is considered 
a primary challenge for applying agile development (Heeager and Nielsen, 2018). Documentation is essential for 
providing what is called the safety argument in the development of safety-critical software, and agile processes do 
not provide enough documentation or provide the wrong kind of documentation for this purpose (Hajou et al. 
2015a; Sidky and Arthur 2007; Wäyrynen et al. 2004). Because of the flexible nature of agile processes, it has 
been concluded however that the amount of documentation in safety-critical projects is not in itself an issue (e.g. 
Gary et al. 2011). Whatever is requested by the customer gets delivered by agile processes, and that can include 
documentation to prove the safety of the software (McHugh et al. 2012). In safety-critical development, the 
documentation is key in stakeholder communication, and it is thus important that the right documentation is 
produced for this purpose (Kasauli et al. 2018). The focus on documentation can however harm the agility and 
flexibility of the development (Jonsson et al. 2012), and the regulatory bodies are not likely to agree to less 
documentation on software requirements and design (Vogel 2006). While Hajou et al. (2015a) stated that the lack 
of documentation can be harmful to the quality of the software, Shafiq and Minhas (2014), on the other hand, 
suggested that agile processes might even result in higher quality software than the plan-driven processes, despite 
the lower focus on documentation. However, it remains open-ended in the existing research literature as to how 
flexible processes and the rigor of documentation can be reconciled. In the practice-based literature, there are 
recommendations on how to include safety documentation, for example, by producing documentation that is 
‘complete, consistent, and unambiguous’ which also includes hazards and mitigations (Van Schooenderwoert and 
Shoemaker 2018, p. 21), though at the same time referring to the agile value of ‘working software over 
comprehensive documentation’.   
Furthermore, a few papers give only scattered examples of how practices have met the requirements for 
documentation. Grenning (2001) and Misra et al. (2010) suggested that it is important to consider the purpose of 
the documentation and determine which parts of the process must be documented. Stålhane et al. (2012) proposed 
a Safe Scrum method in which the documentation is treated as a separate activity in each iteration. In line with 
this, Paige et al. (2008) recommended using sub-teams in charge of documentation and suggested that tools are a 
way to support the activity. 
In the development of safety-critical software, the software requirements must be documented before 
implementation and testing (McHugh et al. 2014a). Writing and updating the documentation of requirements, 
iteratively and incrementally, is a concern for an agile process. When documentation and requirements keep 
changing, it becomes increasingly challenging to ensure traceability amongst the different parts of the 
documentation in all stages of development as mandated by safety standards (Kasauli et al. 2018; McHugh et al. 
2012; McHugh et al. 2014a; Notander et al. 2013a; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008). As safety-critical development 
is most often a very long (up to 30 years) process, changes are bound to happen and need to be handled (Drobka 
et al. 2004; Sidky and Arthur 2007). 
By referring to an FDA standard, Van Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker (2018, p. 57) recommended that, for 
agile development of medical devices, the standard is open to the various forms of documentation. The 
documentation must, however, be produced before the software is developed, though the documentation can be 
produced cumulatively. 
2.2 Engineering Requirements 
For requirements, the agile and the plan-driven processes of safety-critical development differ in two ways, which 
pose a challenge when meshing.  
Firstly, agile processes are open to continuous change of the requirements, whereas in safety-critical software 
development, changing the requirements is discouraged (Notander et al. 2013a; Notander et al. 2013b). The 
changes in the requirements can have severe consequences on the software architecture and may invalidate the 
safety argument (Drobka et al. 2004; Ge et al. 2010), which then need to be changed accordingly. Dealing with 
changing requirements in software development is generally a necessity (Bedoll 2003; Beznosov 2003; Lee and 
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Xia 2010), and as safety-critical development is often a very long-term activity, changes will happen over time as 
the project progresses (Rasmussen 2009). On the other hand, some studies have shown that changes to 
requirements may be less frequent in safety-critical software development, compared to the development of less 
critical software (Ge et al. 2010). The functional requirements may well change considerably over time, whereas 
the safety requirements remain quite stable. Thus, it is recommended to divide the product backlog into two: 
functional requirements (allowed to change more frequently) and safety requirements (kept as stable as possible) 
(Myklebust and Stålhane 2018; Stålhane et al. 2012). Others recommend that only functional requirements and 
hazards analysis are kept separate at the very beginning of a project, but then are eventually integrated later in the 
project (Van Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker 2018). 
Secondly, agile methods generally rely on loosely structured requirements, such as user stories, and that 
conflicts, according to Górski and Łukasiewicz (2013), with regulatory requirements for safety-critical 
development. User stories written in plain business-like language, as suggested by the agile processes, cannot be 
used for validation as the regulatory standards for the development of safety-critical software require well-
structured requirement engineering (Jonsson et al. 2012). The literature offers different strategies for solving this 
issue. Demissie et al. (2016) recommended using user stories as a supplement to the formal requirements, in the 
development of safety-critical software, as agile user stories provoke a discussion between the developers and the 
customer. Boström et al. (2006) advocated using two types of stories, one type for the safety requirements and 
another type for the functional requirements. Hajou et al. (2015b) and Kasauli et al. (2018) suggested combining 
the traditional user stories with risk assessments to fulfil the regulatory requirements. Myklebust and Stålhane 
(2016) suggested using what they call safety stories, which are user stories that include one or more safety 
requirements. These stories follow a pattern close to the pattern of user stories, but include safety requirements. 
Van Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker (2018), on the other hand, based on their experience, recommended that 
stories are quite adequate to capture the important aspects of requirements. 
2.3 Life cycle 
Learning and adapting are essential aspects of agile processes, which are supported by an iterative and incremental 
project life cycle, whereas in safety-critical software development, the project is structured in sequential phases, 
and the V-model is favoured by many (McHugh et al. 2014b). The V-model is a variation of the waterfall model, 
with a particular focus on testing and quality management (Hajou et al. 2015b), and it does not advocate iterations 
and increments (Ge et al. 2010). The V-model is often an idealized explanation for developing safety-critical 
software, as it produces the necessary quality documentation for regulatory approval (McHugh, McCaffery, and 
Coady 2014). Yet, a specific development life cycle is not prescribed by the regulatory process standards (Lin and 
Fan 2009; McHugh et al. 2012; McHugh et al. 2014b; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008). However, the regulations 
present their requirements according to the waterfall model or the V-model and require that, if a different life cycle 
model is followed, an argument of how this life cycle fulfils the requirements must be provided (Myklebust and 
Stålhane 2018). 
Examples of how iterative safety-critical development can be adopted have been shown in various studies 
(Abdelaziz et al. 2015; Heeager 2012; Notander et al. 2013a). However, studies have also shown how iterative 
documentation and validation of an increment is challenging (Beznosov and Kruchten 2004; Jonsson et al. 2012; 
Paige et al. 2008). Beznosov (2003) concluded that using iterations in safety-critical development is similar to 
using iterations in non-safety-critical development, but more difficult. A main concern is that the documentation 
continuously needs to be created and updated; thus, change management is a significant concern with iterative 
development processes. Changes are introduced in most iterations, which may invalidate previous work on 
ensuring safety, when developing systems incrementally (Jonsson et al. 2012). It is also difficult to evaluate the 
quality of safety arguments when working iteratively; therefore, it is advised to conduct the safety analysis 
iteratively and validate the safety incrementally (Kasauli et al. 2018). Incorporating iterative verification 
techniques is challenging, as these activities are work intensive and reduce the use of agile software development 
(Paige et al. 2008). Myklebust and Stålhane (2018) suggested using stepwise integration instead of continuous 
integration. Notander et al. (2013a) and Van Schooenderwoert and Shoemaker (2018) suggested an iterative 
framework for safety-critical software development in which documentation is also treated iteratively and 
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incrementally. Wang et al. (2017) and Wang and Wagner (2018) stated how traditional safety analysis and 
verification techniques are difficult to use with agile software development. Wang et al. (2017) proposed a process 
called S-Scrum, which uses a hazard analysis technique called System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and 
allows for an iterative validation, and Wang and Wagner (2018) proposed using a combination of STPA and 
Behavior-Driven Development (BDD). 
2.4 Testing 
Extensive testing is considered necessary by both the agile and the safety-critical processes (Górski and 
Łukasiewicz 2012). According to Kasauli et al. (2018), using agile processes results in better test cases, which 
improves the quality of the software. However, the testing strategies of the processes differ, and the reconciliation 
of the safety-critical plan-driven testing strategy with the agile strategy is not straightforward. Following the V-
model, the testing is done in the final phases of the development, whereas in agile processes, testing is part of each 
iteration (McCaffery et al. 2016). Adopting iterative testing is difficult due to the high level of required validation 
and verification, quality of documentation and thorough testing of increments, resulting in heavy iterative testing. 
The literature, therefore, has suggested that longer iterations are necessary when developing safety-critical 
software (Rottier and Rodrigues 2008), while Kasauli et al. (2018) have proposed automated, risk-based 
continuous testing (including safety tests).  
 Some agile evangelists have advocated test-first processes as stemming from XP; yet, some have reported that 
it easily clashes when developing safety-critical software (Heeager and Nielsen 2009). In test-driven development, 
developers write the tests themselves, and this proves problematic, as some standards (such as EN 50128) require 
that the tester must be responsible for specifying the test and that the developer and tester must be separate persons 
(Jonsson et al. 2012). 
 A comparative analysis has shown that the test-driven development is compatible with various regulatory 
standards (Paige et al. 2008). There are, furthermore, empirical examples of safety-critical software development 
in which test-first processes have been implemented successfully (Drobka et al. 2004; Grenning 2001; Spence 
2005; VanderLeest and Buter 2009). According to Gorski and Łukasiewicz (2013), this however requires 
adaptations to the agile testing processes.  
Within the safety-critical domain, the software is often embedded in a device. The development of the hardware 
and mechanics of this device cannot be built incrementally in the same way or to the same degree as the software. 
Moreover, it is a challenge to carry out incremental testing due to dependencies on dedicated hardware (Paige et 
al. 2005; Wils et al. 2006).  
3 Case Study Approach 
The study follows the guidelines for conducting a case study in software engineering by Runeson and Höst (2009); 
thus, this methodological section is divided into three subsections: case study design and planning, data collection 
and data analysis. 
3.1 Case Study Design and Planning 
The purpose of this study was descriptive (Runeson and Höst 2009); thus, the purpose was to portray the situation 
as it unfolded (Gregor, 2006) and provide a deeper understanding of what a software team can do to mesh agile 
and plan-driven processes when developing safety-critical software. A case study approach was chosen, as this 
method is suited for understanding the complex real-world setting of developing software while meshing the agile 
and plan-driven processes. Case study research is highly accepted both in information systems research (Walsham 
2006) and software engineering research (Runeson and Höst 2009). We used a holistic case study (Yin 2009) in 
which a large pharmaceutical company in Denmark was the case organization, and the unit of analysis was the 
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practice of a software team developing software for an embedded safety-critical device. Thus, we focused on the 
meshed software practice in the context of a large, traditional pharmaceutical organization.  
3.2 Data Collection 
The case study was based on qualitative data gathered over almost two years by using different data collection 
techniques and by involving multiple sources (Runeson and Höst 2009). Collecting data over a longer period 
through multiple iterations allowed time to elaborate on the findings before collecting more data. By using three 
different data collection techniques (interviews, observations and archival study), we sought data source 
triangulation and gained both first-, second- and third-degree insights into the software practice (Runeson and Höst 
2009). By involving multiple data sources with different roles (managers, developers and testers), we sought 
different interpretations of the phenomenon (Runeson and Höst 2009). 
The data were collected in the final stage of the development project in the case organization, but included an 
historical view of the process. The time of study was appropriate, as the software team, at that point, had gained 
sufficient experience with using agile software processes for the development of the medical device.  
The data collection was divided into two phases (see Table 2). The purpose of the first phase was to map the 
current software practice, as well as the interviewee’s evaluation of the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
practice. The first phase was concluded with a seminar presentation with the purpose of validating the findings. 
The second phase took place almost a year after the first phase; over that intervening period, the case organization 
had reflected on the findings of the first phase and had changed and improved the practice accordingly. Therefore, 
we found it relevant and insightful to conduct another round of data collection. Within each phase, the interviews 
were done in two iterations, approximately two months apart.  
 
Table 2 Overview of the data collection 
 
Phase Focus Data # Participants 
1 
 
Initial mapping and evaluation of the 
software practice 
Seven interviews 1 The process manager  
2 A software architect 
3 A software tester 
4–7 Four software developers 
Eight interviews 8 The process manager  
9 The software architect 
10 A software tester  
11–15 Five software developers 
Observations of practice 
Archival study 
Seminar presentation and validation 
2 Mapping and evaluation of changes 
and improvements of the software 
practice 
Seven interviews 16 The product owner proxy 
17 A project group coordinator 
18 A Scrum consultant 
19 A software tester  
20–22 Three software developers 
Five interviews 23 A process manager 
24 A software architect 
25 A software tester 
26–27 Two software developers 
Observations of meetings 
Archival data 
Report and validation 
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Interviews are an important data collection technique in case studies (Runeson and Höst 2009) and were the 
primary data source; we collected a total of 27 qualitative interviews. In the first phase, a total of 15 qualitative 
interviews were conducted with the managers, developers and testers. In the second phase, 12 interviews were 
conducted with the managers, software developers, testers and a consultant specializing in Scrum who had been 
affiliated with the software team for six months. The interviews were all based on semi-structured qualitative 
interview guides with open questions inviting a broad range of answers (the interview guides are included in 
Appendix A). In the first phase, the questions focused on mapping the current practice and identifying both agile 
and plan-driven elements. The focus of the second phase was on the changes and improvements that had been 
incorporated in the software practice between the first and second phases. Approximately half of the interviewees 
participated both in the first phase and in the second phase. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Several observations of the software practice were conducted to provide details of how meetings were performed 
(e.g. the daily Scrum meetings and the planning meetings), and to provide a richer, first-hand view. The 
observations had a low degree of interaction by the researcher and a low awareness of being observed by the 
participants (Runeson and Höst 2009). The observations were documented by note taking in structured forms 
developed based on the purpose of the observation. The notes were supplemented with photos when allowed.  
The data collection was also supported by archival data, for example, a software development handbook created 
by the organization and examples of documents provided for the FDA. The purpose of the archival data was to 
gain a deeper insight into documents supporting the practice.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
After each round of data collection, the data were analysed to create an initial understanding of the software 
practice. The data analysis used open coding to identify, respectively, the agile and the plan-driven elements of the 
software practice, as well as the challenges and advantages. This analysis resulted in mappings of how the practice 
was conducted at the two points of data collection. At the end of each phase, a report was prepared and used for 
validation.  
In the final analysis, a more thorough analysis was conducted; the qualitative data from both phases were 
analysed and coded in Nvivo. The coding was based on the four areas of concern from the literature, which were 
created as predefined codes. All quotes relating to one of these areas were identified and assigned to the code. If a 
quote mentioned two areas, the quote was assigned to its primary area. Simultaneously, the data were coded using 
open coding; this was done both to open up the possibility of other areas emerging and to have the codes describe 
the quotes more carefully. No other areas emerged, so all open codes and their underlying quotes could be assigned 
to one of the predefined codes. Based on the open codes, two to three categories emerged within each of the four 
areas. The process is visualized in Table 3 with all open codes and categories.  
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Table 3 Focus through areas of concern, open codes and categories of open codes 
Areas of 
concern 
Open codes Categories of codes 
Documentation Plan focuses on documentation 
Early documentation 
Focus on documentation 
Compliance documentation 
Difficult to create flexibility in documentation 
Strict process of changing documentation 
Depending on requirements at higher levels 
Fast and slow changeability 
Requirements Difficulties understanding requirements 
Problems with details in requirements 
Problems with requirements in general 
Requirements uncertainty 
Rewriting of requirements is necessary 
Difficult to convince management of rewriting  
New requirements are improved 
Requirements changeability 
Life cycle Reluctance towards Scrum and iterations 
Sprints are advantageous 
Iteration length 
Changing practice 
Stopped using iterations Milestone alignment 
Interruptions of iterations 
Slices do not fit 
Hardware, software and mechanics co-
development 
Testing Developers lacking testing skills 
Strict testing procedures 
Use specialized roles with testers and developers 
Reluctance towards test-driven development 
Practice and competence 
Prioritizes new functionality over tests 
No time for test in iterations 
Unit test is often postponed 
Management priorities and progress 
 
4 Case Description: The Software Team and Its Practice 
This case study concerned a sizeable pharmaceutical company within which a project, involving the development 
of a safety-critical clinical device with embedded software, took place. This project was the first and, by far, the 
largest and most complicated software project in the company. Due to a high level of safety-criticality, the medical 
device and development hereof had to be compliant with a large number of regulations, specifically those related 
to regulatory standards of the US FDA. The project consisted of several project groups, each with its area of focus, 
such as mechanics, hardware and software. In total, over 100 managers, engineers and developers were working 
on this project. The unit of analysis was the meshed software practice, that is, what the software team had done to 
implement elements from the agile method Scrum, while still ensuring compliance with the FDA and fitting in to 
a larger project that was genuinely plan-driven. Fig. 1. depicts this relationship between the organization serving 
as the context of the project in charge of developing the medical device and how the software team was (one) part 
of this project. Everything outside the software team was treated as context. 
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Fig. 1 The unit of analysis and its context 
 
At the time of the study, the project had run for several years and had come into the last stages of refining the 
product. The project followed a linear V-model consisting of phases and milestones. This model was widely used 
in the organization and was deeply rooted in its practice of developing new medical products. The milestones at 
the end of each phase were used to control and evaluate the progress of the project. To reach a milestone and move 
to the next phase, each project group had to provide documentation proving that its goal had been reached. During 
the time of data collection, the developers often talked about how to achieve the next milestone, how the project 
was being held back, and which project group was to blame for the stagnation.  
 The requirements for the product were, to a large degree, formed at the beginning of the project and were mostly 
based on a user survey. In addition, a hazard analysis was performed (as required by regulatory standards) to 
highlight the risks for the users of the device. The identified hazards resulted in requirements for the device and 
the software to mitigate the risks. The requirements were frozen and written into different documents, such as the 
device specification and the hazard analysis. The project and the development project thus relied on several 
documents arranged in a strict hierarchy. The documents placed at the higher levels had been through a strict and 
time-consuming process to be approved by several stakeholders at the beginning of the project. These documents 
did not change or became difficult to change. In particular, the hazard analysis was placed at the higher levels. The 
documents at the lower levels were easier to change as a less strict approval process was required. The detailed 
design of the software was, for example, documented at the lower levels. The software requirements specification 
was placed at the middle of the hierarchy. 
The company had had a long and successful history of developing medical devices, but at that point had very 
limited experience in the area of software development. Most software processes for this particular project had to 
be established as part of the project. In the initial stage of the project, the software team experienced a high degree 
of complexity and uncertainty in the tasks and requirements. To overcome these challenges, the software team 
decided to implement the agile method, Scrum, and attempt to achieve a mesh between plan-driven processes and 
agile processes. This decision was made by the software team (primarily by the software team manager) and did 
not involve other teams in the project. Scrum was chosen as it was expected to be simple and easy to implement, 
and it was expected to support the software team with coping adaptively with the project’s uncertainties.  
During the time of data collection, the software team expanded drastically to 30 developers, testers, and 
managers. The software team consisted of the software project manager, a software architect, the process manager, 
a coordinator responsible for the coordination with the larger system engineering project, developers and testers. 
The software developers who were hired during this period had a strong software background and experience in 
agile software development, and the developers who were initially on the team had a traditional background in 
engineering. The management of the software team acknowledged that the original developers were less competent 
in agile processes. Moreover, several skilled coaches and educators were involved in educating the developers; for 
example, a consultant facilitating the Scrum practice was associated with the software team for six months. In this 
way, there was a planned compensation for the relative inexperience of the original developers. 
The software team faced several problems adapting to Scrum due to internal issues within the software team 
and external issues caused by the software team’s context. However, the software team did implement elements of 
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Scrum and moved towards a much more agile software development, that is, a mesh of agile and plan-driven 
processes. 
The developers sought to plan their development tasks in iterations containing programming, unit testing and 
internal delivery of the increments, as prescribed by Scrum. The software team experimented with iteration length, 
but in the end, they found two weeks most fitting for them. The iterations were initiated with a planning meeting 
where a sprint backlog was created, and the tasks included were estimated. The software requirements specification 
served as the software backlog; however, tasks were neither created nor prioritized by customers, neither in the 
sense of potential patients (users of the medical device) nor in the sense of a customer proxy from within the 
project. The tasks chosen for the sprint were written on post-it notes and placed on the Scrum task board for 
visualizing the status of the iteration. The task board was supplemented with burndown charts visualizing the 
progress of the iteration. Daily stand-up meetings were used for coordination amongst the developers within the 
iteration. In that way, the developers relied very little on written documentation for knowledge sharing and 
coordination within the software team.  
Several tasks were not always completed by the end of an iteration. First, the developers tended to underestimate 
the tasks, mainly because they experienced problems breaking them down to a manageable size. Second, many of 
the developers were specialists and were not able to solve every task on the board on their own. When this issue 
was not taken into sufficient consideration during planning, the tasks had to wait for a few developers to address 
them, and therefore they became bottlenecks. Third, for security reasons, all tasks were to be peer-reviewed with 
a colleague, and the developers were required to have 100% condition-decision coverage on unit tests before 
completion. Several tasks were not reviewed and tested by the end of an iteration, as the developers had to direct 
more attention to implementing new functionality than to finalizing the current task.  
The developers were in charge of creating the unit test cases. The unit tests ran automatically every day to ensure 
that errors were not introduced into the software. At the end of an iteration, the software increments were integrated 
into the existing configuration, and after the integration test, the increments were sent to the system engineering 
group system-level testing. When errors occurred at this point, these were formally reported back to the software 
team, and a formal procedure for correcting and documenting the correction of the error had to be followed. Not 
all software increments were properly unit tested before being integrated, and several errors were found during the 
system test, creating a slow testing-debugging-correction process. Each iteration was concluded with an evaluation 
of both the process and the current increments. 
5 Results  
The case study analysis was based on the four areas of concern identified in the literature (cf. Section 2) and 
showed not only how the software team moved towards meshed development practices but also how the meshed 
practices were primarily plan-driven due to the regulatory requirements and to the large systems engineering 
project of which the software team was only one part.  
The analysis of the case data showed that the software team had found it hardest to mesh within the areas of 
documentation and requirements. Within the area of documentation, the developers struggled with an overhead of 
documentation only written to prove compliance and with time-consuming procedures when changes were 
necessary. Uncertainty of requirements arose mainly due to the lack of customer contact (which is not unusual for 
safety-critical products) and due to slow the changeability of requirements. The software team found it difficult to 
implement an agile testing practice. The developers lacked the needed competences and the management lacked 
in prioritising testing. The software team was able to achieve a mesh within the area of life cycle by embedding an 
iterative software practice within the overall project that was linear and strictly plan-driven. Changing from a linear 
practice to an iterative one, however, met with resistance, and challenges in alignment with the linear project model 
and other project groups occurred.  
Table 4 provides an overview of the results in terms of the categories identified in the case study and a short 
empirically based explanation of each category. The detailed results are described in the following subsections. 
We took the results as descriptions of meshed practices for developing safety-critical software in particular. 
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Table 4 The identified categories of meshed practices 
Areas of concern Categories Explanations from practice 
Documentation Compliance documentation Much documentation is needed and only 
produced to prove compliance. 
Fast and slow changeability While some documents can change fast and 
often, others require a long, strict procedure. In 
addition, most documents were written early on 
in the process. 
Requirements Requirement uncertainty Requirements uncertainty is higher at the 
beginning of the project, at the point of which 
the requirements were specified. Uncertainties 
about requirements are a greater issue when no 
immediate customer is present. 
Requirements changeability The requirements hierarchy lowered the 
flexibility of the requirements. 
Life cycle Changing practice Many developers were reluctant to change their 
practice. 
Milestone alignment Safety-critical projects are often controlled by 
milestones; developing embedded software in 
iterations require alignment with these. 
Hardware, software and mechanics 
co-development 
With an embedded device, coordination with 
hardware and mechanics is required. 
Testing Practice and competence Changing the testing practice from plan-driven 
to agile requires different skills. 
Management priorities and progress Implementing agile testing requires prioritizing  
by management. 
5.1 The Use of Documentation 
The software team was less able to mesh their use of documentation than anticipated and remained plan-driven 
within this area. The software team did adopt an agile strategy for daily coordination within the software team. 
However, a large number of documents were written for the sole purpose of complying with the FDA standard. 
Handling the documents in a light and iterative manner which could better accommodate change proved highly 
difficult for the software team, and according to the project and software managers, this was due to the strict 
approval process for documentation. Two categories of meshed documentation in safety-critical development 
emerged: compliance documentation and fast and slow changeability.  
5.1.1 Compliance Documentation 
The project had to provide a substantial amount of documentation to show compliance with the FDA standard for 
safety-critical devices, as the understanding was that all aspects of the product had to be documented. The design, 
the code, the code reviews, the safety hazard, and the strategies for mitigating the hazards were all documented. 
Thus, the software team spent much time writing documentation and having the documentation approved. Most of 
this was written at the beginning of the project (e.g., the requirement specifications). Some of the documentation 
had already been written and approved before the software development started.  
The analysis showed how most of the documents were written with the sole purpose of validating the safety of 
the software product. The documents were not used for knowledge sharing and coordination within and amongst  
teams. The documentation was read by only a few people. In its place, the software team used face-to-face 
communication as their primary way to coordinate and share knowledge, as suggested by the agile processes. The 
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daily Scrum meeting and the planning meeting at the beginning of each sprint provided ample opportunities for 
the software team.  
‘I think they [stand-up meetings] are great. That is where we, well, normally at a stand-up meeting 
in the morning you briefly tell what did I do yesterday, what am I going to do today and what is 
blocking me right now. That is not exactly how it works here, we are discussing more at our stand-
up meetings, but that shows that we work very closely together, so we need much planning to make 
the day work’. (Interview 16)   
To further support knowledge sharing, the software team additionally used several ‘information radiators’ (an 
agile tactic to pass along information quickly and quietly), for example, Scrum boards displaying the status and 
progress of the sprint. These Scrum boards provided an opportunity for instantly receiving relevant information 
with minimum effort. This knowledge sharing tactic was perceived as being useful in practice by the software 
developers, whereas much documentation was not found useful despite the safety-critical issues addressed in the 
documentation. The safety-critical issues in need of coordination and knowledge sharing were addressed through 
the light-weight Scrum meetings, boards, and a few ad hoc meetings where developers discussed their problem-
solving after the morning meeting. 
This way of adapting to the requirements of the FDA thus required the software team to spend a great deal of 
time producing documentation required by the overall project that did not support or improve their software 
practice. On the other hand, they found a way to coordinate in a more agile manner within the team.   
5.1.2 Fast and Slow Changeability 
Due to the strict documentation hierarchy, the changeability of most documents was very slow and some were 
even almost impossible to change. The software team especially struggled with slow changeability of the software 
requirements specification. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that several documents had been written in 
the early stages of the project, both due to requirements by the FDA standards that certain documents were to be 
produced before the product was developed (e.g. a safety hazard analysis) but also due to the overall project model 
which focused on milestones and written evidence for progress.  
The V-model is an often used as a  tactic in safety-critical projects (though not a requirement), and the company 
having had a long history in the pharmaceutical industry had established and adapted a V-model to be used across 
all its projects. A major part of this model is the focus on delivering the documents needed for the final regulative 
approval of the product. The milestones in the V-model thus forced the software team to focus on writing 
documentation and describing the software up front to progress through the phases. The software team was 
therefore limited in developing the software and the documents iteratively. 
‘. . . due to our previous milestone, suddenly we had to have a whole bunch of documents ready, 
which did affect the progress of the product, to have these documents ready’. (Interview 24) 
The software team often found a need to change and update some of the documents, but also found the process 
of changing these documents extremely difficult. The software team sought a much more flexible process in 
handling the documentation to fit better with its more flexible way of working.  
‘The main challenge is to introduce flexibility in the artefacts [i.e. documents], that we have to 
produce.’ (Interview 23)  
To improve flexibility, the software team dealt with lower-level documentation iteratively by writing this in 
increments, improving the low-level specifications as new information came up or experience was gained. They 
were only partly successful in doing so because of the management focus and perceived regulatory requirements 
for full upfront documentation, as described by the project model. The tactic of treating the low-level specifications 
as output from sprints enabled a faster changeability and a smoother mesh with agile development. However, 
changing the high-level documents was much more complex and time-consuming and led to slow changeability, 
and the key explanation for this in this case was that the slow changeability was caused by the regulatory 
requirements.  
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5.2 Requirements Engineering 
The analysis identified two main categories within the area of requirements engineering: requirements uncertainty 
and requirements changeability. Requirements uncertainty arose due to poorly written requirements specifications 
and because no customer was affiliated. This was partly connected to changeability, as requirements were then 
bound to change.  
5.2.1 Requirements Uncertainty 
Due to the safety-critical regulations, most requirements were gathered and documented early. The early 
requirements were superficially described and, at times, difficult to understand. The high-level requirements were 
based on a thorough analysis. The requirements were uneven in detail and specificity, and later some were found 
to be too specific or even conflicting. According to the process manager, these issues occurred because the 
marketing group responsible for the initial requirements was not specialized in software requirements and because 
the requirements had been specified too early in the project. The software team faced severe problems because of 
these requirements.   
‘We have to start over with the product specification and restructure it and move many of the 
requirements, because many of these are very specific and need to be specified in the lower-level 
documents’. (Interview 4) 
This issue was complicated because the software team was not able to consult a customer representative or a 
customer proxy. Also, they found it difficult to understand the requirements. The lack of a customer representative 
also impacted negatively on the Scrum practice in other ways. Each sprint was initiated with a planning meeting 
and a sprint review meeting, but as no customer participated at the meetings, the developers found it difficult to 
define a common goal and commit to achieving the goal.  
 ‘We say we run a Scrum model, but who is our product owner? That has been one of the challenges 
since day one and had been a challenge long before I came. I asked for the product owner when I 
landed, but no one could give me an answer; they could provide a political product owner, but that 
is not what it is all about. It has to be someone who can make day-to-day decisions about the 
product’. (Interview 18) 
To address these issues, the software team attempted to engage a representative from the marketing group to fill 
the role of a product owner and help resolve the issues and uncertainties of the requirements. This, however, did 
not turn out as expected, the main reason being that management would not grant the resources needed for an 
internal product owner proxy. With a background in traditional plan-driven development of safety-critical 
products, the management did not understand the needs of the software team to be more agile. The role of the 
product owner was eventually assigned to the software architect within the software team. However, he did not 
have the necessary knowledge nor the authority to implement this tactic.  
I write use cases right now, but I am also working with the software. I have to design the software; 
that means if I have misunderstood something when I write use cases, you find the mistake in the 
software because I do both. I would rather get the use cases from the business or at least have them 
help write the use cases, so we can avoid the misunderstandings, that I am sure are in there’. 
(Interview 9) 
5.2.2 Requirements Changeability 
The marketing group was responsible for the high-level requirements that went through an approval process before 
being submitted to the software team. The software team was responsible for the detailed design of each software 
requirement. Thus, changing ill-described requirements at the higher levels of the requirements was challenging 
and time-consuming. Nonetheless, the software process manager recommended a rewriting of these requirements 
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in the later stages of the project because of the problems experienced by the software team. The software team had 
to push for the rewriting of these requirements as the management did not realize how poor the requirements were 
and what consequences this had on the design.  
‘The software team acknowledged the problems of the high-level requirements, a long time ago, 
but the rest of the project did not want to acknowledge the problems; so it was difficult to push the 
changes through; but as far as I have heard, people are generally happy that they were rewritten’. 
(Interview 23)  
Many better-suited requirements came from the rewriting based on the experiences and learning in the project. 
To increase agility in the handling of the lower-level requirements, the software team transformed the software 
requirements into an internally and less formal product backlog with prioritized and estimated tasks, suiting the 
Scrum process. These tasks were referred to as user stories by the developers, even though the tasks were not 
written by users and were not in the form of user stories as proposed by the agile processes. 
5.3 Life Cycle 
The software team implemented a highly iterative software practice encapsulated in the linear phases of the overall 
project model. Meshing towards an iterative software practice showed how challenging it was, how aligning 
iterations with the milestones of the project model challenged the software team and how the co-development with 
other project teams interrupted the workflow of the software team.  
5.3.1 Changing Practice 
The overall project model was an adapted combination of the V-model and a stage-gate model, which is a linear 
model consisting of phases separated by gates, in which the process of the project is assessed before moving to the 
next phase. The V-model is recommended but not required by the FDA standard for developing safety-critical 
products and has been used by the pharmaceutical company for several years. The purpose of the gates is to ensure 
the production of appropriate documentation for regulative approval and to ensure the progress of the project. This 
model has been useful in the past when developing hardware and mechanics, which are much less iterative than 
software development. Therefore, the management of the project did not want to change the overall project model 
even though this model limited the agility of the software practice.  
With the linear model, the software team lacked flexibility and the possibility of accommodating change. It was 
therefore decided to mesh Scrum with the software practice and thus divide the software development into sprints. 
This was not easy for the software developers, as they found it difficult to break the tasks into sprints. Most of the 
developers were experienced in safety-critical development. They were specialists and used to focusing on a 
specific parts of a development. The lack of generalist knowledge affected the tasks chosen for each iteration; 
instead of choosing the tasks with the highest priority, tasks were chosen according to the competences of the 
developers.  
Gradually, most of the developers grew more accustomed to the Scrum practice and the sprints. A few 
developers were reallocated to other projects, and new developers with experience in agile development joined the 
software team. The software team gradually found agile development advantageous. They came to see short sprints 
as particularly useful as that gave the developers a fluid work rhythm and dedicated focus. This forced the team to 
break the tasks into even smaller units, which resulted in transparency and had a positive influence on the ability 
of the developers to estimate the tasks. 
‘Using two-week sprints, we had to be very precise breaking down the tasks and be very precise 
defining the criteria for when the tasks are done. That made it much easier to see what the tasks 
contained. We had to figure that out, and then it was easier to talk in a subgroup when we would 
be done’. (Interview 24) 
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Gradually learning to become agile is likely a relevant lesson that can be learned from all kinds of software 
development. Here, it came about in the context of the development of safety-critical software, and as such, it was 
specific to the case and the fact that there was a mix of competences present as some developers were safety-
critical specialists and some were already trained in agile methods but without the safety-critical knowledge. 
5.3.2 Milestone Alignment 
As the iterations were encapsulated in the linear project model, the software team still had to work towards the 
goal of each of the linear phases, and the iterations thus had to fit with the long-term milestones. For example, the 
developers had to specify the design of the software and get it approved to pass one of the milestones.  
‘ . . . due to our previous milestone, suddenly we had to have a whole bunch of documents ready, 
which did affect the progress of the product, to have these documents ready’. (Interview 24) 
The milestones therefore profoundly influenced the content of each iteration and lowered its agility. It was 
difficult for the software team to develop a whole increment of the software because the requirements for a 
milestone were created based on traditional, linear thinking, and that, in turn, was caused by the perceived need to 
comply with the regulatory standards, according to the informants.  
5.3.3 Hardware, Software and Mechanics Co-development 
As the software was encapsulated in the medical product, the software team had to collaborate and co-develop 
with several of the other project teams. The software team was, for example, working in close cooperation with 
the engineers developing the hardware and the mechanics, such as providing the hardware team with test scripts 
to test the hardware. The requests for test scripts often came as interruptions within the software iterations and thus 
affected the outcome of the iterations. 
‘I don’t think that, in half a year I have been employed here, there has been an iteration without 
any interruptions from other places. Some of them were small, but there have also been larger 
changes’. (Interview 9)  
The Scrum Master did try to enforce the rule of not interrupting the developers when in a sprint; however, 
several of these interruptions were unavoidable as serious problems affecting the safety-critical issues of the 
product as a whole had to be solved. Some of these problems arose due to severe errors in the existing software 
discovered at the system test at a release; others came from changes in the requirements by other project teams. 
5.4 Testing 
In the analysis of how the software team meshed the practice with the area of testing, two categories emerged: 
practice and competence, and management priorities and progress. Testing is a key concern in development of 
safety-critical software, and in this case, the developers needed to improve their competences in unit testing. 
Furthermore, the management needed to allocate resources to prioritize testing. 
5.4.1 Practice and Competence 
Even though the software team expressed an interest in implementing an agile testing practice, many unit tests 
were postponed until later stages of the project, and each increment was not fully tested at the end of an iteration 
before the software was released for the system test. Errors found during the later system tests were by the 
regulative standards required to be handled more formally than those found during unit tests and integration tests, 
and this slowed the progress. 
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‘We started late on the tests, and there are several reasons why. Again, the knowledge about testing 
in the original software team was low’. (Interview 8)  
Several of the developers did not initially have the necessary competences to conduct proper unit tests, and 
many of them prioritized the implementation of new functionality instead of finishing and testing the implemented 
functionality. Thus, the implementation of a test-driven practice required a significant change in the mindset of the 
developers. By the time the developers had gained more experience and had grown more attuned to agile software 
testing, much of the software had not been tested, and many errors still remained in the previous increments. This 
led to problems in the continuous integration of the software, and the software team spent too much time in 
correcting these errors. 
‘You have finished the code, but the release is scheduled soon, so the time for testing is shortened. 
The argument often is that the code you want to finish is important for the iteration’. (Interview 9)  
5.4.2 Management Priorities and Progress 
The management did not support the implementation of test-driven development. This management focus made 
improvements towards an agile test-driven practice challenging for the software manager. Testing was planned for 
the final stages in the plan-driven life cycle of the project, and very little time and focus were applied to testing. 
Management frequently wanted new functionality in the running prototype to present the latest version for the 
upper management and the marketing staff, as well as other stakeholders. As a result, no resources were allocated 
to support the introduction of better testing practices, and no resources were allocated to increase developer agile 
testing competences.    
‘It is difficult to get understanding at the upper levels that testing is important’. (Interview 1)  
The process manager in the software team spent much effort on convincing management that testing was just as 
essential as functionality, but was not successful in doing so until very late in the project. 
 
6 Discussion 
Four areas of concern were identified in the review of the literature on agility in safety-critical software 
development, and these were instrumental in enabling us to focus on the categories of the codes found in the case 
study data, ultimately leading to the explanation displayed in Table 4 which resulted from the case analysis. In this 
section, we discuss the four areas of concern and the findings vis-à-vis the extant research.    
6.1 Use of Documentation 
The amount of documentation required for the validation of safety-critical software is a primary barrier in the 
existing literature (cf. Section 2) (McHugh et al. 2014a; Notander et al. 2013a). The case analysis corroborated 
this but in a slightly different way. The software developers spent much time and effort in writing and approving 
documents to satisfy the validation of the product, but they worked on the documentation with the sole purpose of 
being compliant with the standards. Other studies suggested that it should be possible to minimize the overhead of 
producing documentation (Grenning 2001; Stålhane et al. 2012). In the case analysis, it was found that the software 
developers considered documentation as a part of the delivery for each iteration, as also suggested by Wils et al. 
(2006), and moved towards being more agile with respect to documentation of compliance. Despite the fact that 
they focused on keeping the documentation to a minimum, they found this very difficult, as their main priority was 
to comply with the regulations of the FDA. Thus, even though they spent much time scrutinizing the requirements 
stated by the FDA, they found it difficult to decrease the focus on documentation.  
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The software developers did not depend much on the documentation during sprints, and they found this 
advantageous. Thus, the case study showed that splitting the purpose of documentation into (1) compliance and 
(2) knowledge sharing in the software team may be vital to striking a balance between compliance and agility.  
The case analysis further showed that changeability can sometimes be very fast, and when requiring approval, 
it is often very slow. Handling documents flexibly and, at the same time, producing the compliance documentation 
for validation require deliberate tactics for being fast and slow at the same time. Being deliberately slow will be 
advantageous when, for example, standards such as those of the FDA stipulate that software requirements should 
be explicitly documented before implementation and testing (McHugh et al. 2014a; Van Schooenderwoert and 
Shoemaker 2018). In this case study, it was found that several documents were written and formally approved 
early on and that slowed their changeability dramatically, but existing research had nothing to offer to explain the 
differences of such documents and that they, therefore, must be handled differently. 
 
6.2 Engineering of Requirements 
 
Well-structured requirement engineering is needed according to the regulatory standards for safety-critical 
software development (cf. Section 2) (Jonsson et al. 2012; Vogel 2006). Moreover, according to Beznosov (2003), 
user stories written in simple business-like language cannot be used for validation. However, the case study 
revealed that, to comply with the agile process of Scrum and implement the product and sprint backlogs, the 
software developers needed to deal with requirements uncertainty, and they found it is easier to do with less formal 
specifications.  
In the case study, it was found that the software developers acknowledged that they specified the requirements 
in two different ways, depending on degrees of uncertainty. For the software team in the case study, it is likely that 
following the recommendation made by Rottier and Rodrigues (2008) to separate functional requirements (less 
formal) and safety requirements (more formal) would have been advantageous in addition to considering the degree 
of uncertainty. 
Adapting and changing requirements is a central feature and advantage of the agile processes (Lin and Fan 
2009), and at the same time, changes in requirements are found to be problematic and potentially harmful to the 
safety argument (cf. Section 2) (McHugh et al. 2013; McHugh et al. 2014b). The case analysis indicated that, 
despite the requirements being based on an in-depth upfront analysis, it was also necessary to change the safety-
critical software requirements. Requirements related to safety hazards are less likely to change as compared with 
the functional requirements (cf. Section 2), and this was largely corroborated in the case study. Thus, the 
categorization of the requirements into safety requirements and functional requirements allowed the developers to 
apply the requirements differently (Abdelaziz et al. 2015; Stålhane et al. 2012). In the case study, their requirements 
were specified in a hierarchy, that is, the higher the requirements were placed in the hierarchy, the more difficult 
it became to change. A more adaptable process of changing and modifying the functional requirements would be 
made more productive by placing the safety requirements at the higher levels and the functional requirements at 
the lower levels.   
6.3 Life Cycle 
The V-model is a fundamental life cycle model used in much of the literature to ensure validation and verification 
of produced artefacts (cf. Section 2). Because the V-model produces the necessary deliverables required when 
seeking regulatory approval (McHugh et al. 2014b), it is considered theoretically suitable for safety-critical 
software development. The case study showed a similar application of the V-model, but for the overall project, it 
was used along with a stage-gate model to ensure controlled progress, thus leading to a linear project life cycle 
with milestones. The agile software development was embedded in the overall linear project life cycle. The analysis 
showed that the milestones limited the flexibility of the iterations and thus considerably affected the agility of the 
software process. The software developers did not resolve this problem. On the contrary, they adjusted the content 
of the iterations to conform to the objective of the next milestone. There are similar findings in a case study of 
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software development in general (Karlström and Runeson 2006). The literature on agile development of safety-
critical software also does not address this issue and thus does not offer solutions. 
Most safety-critical projects include embedded software, and the literature on agile safety-critical development 
does not address the challenge of coordination between project groups (Demissie et al. 2016). For embedded 
systems, software and hardware must be co-developed (Ronkainen and Abrahamsson 2003), and that was also the 
situation in the case study where the co-development involved software, hardware and mechanics. Within agile 
software development, it is recommended to adhere to an iterative development strategy (Cockburn 2006), whereas 
a linear process is considered to be suitable for the development of hardware and mechanics (Wysocki 2011). The 
software developers in the case study were required to balance the development of new functionality and test 
scripts. When the hardware and mechanics groups required software test scripts, they often interrupted the software 
team’s sprints to develop these test scripts instead of adding them as tasks to the product backlog. The case analysis 
revealed that the coordination between sub-projects was addressed by asking the hardware and mechanics groups 
to submit their requests for support to the Scrum Master, who then would determine whether the issue needed to 
be solved right away (thus overruling the timebox) or if it could wait for the next sprint. The case study also showed 
repeated examples of requests from the hardware and mechanics groups that deliberately ignored this and kept 
disrupting the developers. Reasonable co-development is therefore difficult to achieve as software teams and 
hardware teams can work according to very different strategies. 
6.4 Testing 
The literature points to three challenges when meshing testing processes. First, to adopt an iterative testing strategy 
requires significant changes in the work practice (McCaffery et al. 2016; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008), and as 
already mentioned, developers find it difficult to change their working practice. The case study indicated that this 
is even more relevant when looking at testing practices. Changing to agile testing practices requires considerable 
new skills and competences, and this is not lessened when testing safety-critical software. The research literature, 
as well as the practice-oriented literature, addresses agile testing procedures (e.g. Droba et al. 2004; VanderLeest 
and Buter 2009; Van Schooenderwoert and Showmaker 2018), but the difficulties of acquiring the new and very 
needed skills and competences are not mentioned. In this case study, the management, in the initial phases of the 
project, realized that the software team did not have the appropriate competencies in agile software development 
and testing. They, therefore, hired additional experienced developers and agile consultants who could coach agile 
software development. But, they never managed to deliver fully developed and tested increments at the end of each 
iteration. The second challenge identified in the literature regards the roles related to testing (Jonsson et al. 2012). 
In the case study company, much testing was done by a separate testing team to comply with the FDA regulations; 
however, this team was even less agile than the software developers. The third challenge is how to handle heavy, 
iterative testing of the software increments (Kasauli et al. 2018; Rottier and Rodrigues 2008). This challenge was 
also shown in the case study. Although the company had successfully automated the tests, it struggled with many 
bugs in the software which made continuous integration very difficult. 
7 Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to answer the question: For safety-critical software, what can a software 
team do to mesh agile and plan-driven processes effectively? The answer to the question is vital to understanding 
the possibilities and difficulties in agile safety-critical software development. From a literature review, we 
explained four areas of concern of particular importance when developing safety-critical software. We then 
reported from a case study of a pharmaceutical company in which an agile software team operated in an otherwise 
plan-driven environment. The contribution is an elaborated understanding of the four areas of concern and how 
they extend to the categories reported in Section 5 and summarized in Table 4 as a conceptual framework: 
 
• Use of documentation 
o Compliance documentation 
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o Fast and slow changeability 
• Requirements engineering 
o Requirements uncertainty 
o Requirements changeability 
• Life cycle 
o Changing practice 
o Milestone alignment 
o Hard, software and mechanics co-development 
• Testing 
o Practice and competence 
o Management priorities and progress 
 
In the discussion, the findings were compared with current research to explain the novelty of the findings. In 
this research, we followed the case study approach as advocated for software engineering research (Runeson and 
Höst 2009). The case study approach has limitations that are generic to any case study, namely, that it seeks insight 
from a single case. Within this single case, we have exercised several measures to increase the validity as there 
were multiple qualitative interviews, the data collection was longitudinal, explicit analysis and validation activities 
were conducted, and triangulation with document studies and participant observation was undertaken. The 
selection of the pharmaceutical company as the case organization was deliberate and served the purpose well as 
its products (and the processes leading to the products) were under the strict regulation of the FDA and, thus, 
highly relevant. There are two immediate and future research directions that can be taken to overcome the built-in 
limitations of our study. First, embarking on other qualitative studies of the subject in other case organizations 
where the challenges may well differ can very likely broaden the insights gained from, if not directly confirm, the 
findings of our study. Second, our findings can form the basis of a survey amongst developers of safety-critical 
software. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guides 
 
Interview Guide, Phase 1 
Themes Questions 
Regulations What are the regulative requirements? How do they affect your work? 
Agile Why did you implement an agile method? What is your evaluation of the agile method? 
Process Please walk me through the elements of your process? What is the evaluation of each of 
these elements? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this process? How do you evaluate this process? 
How do you coordinate within the software team? How do you coordinate with people 
outside the software team? 
Documentation Which documents do you use? Who is responsible for handling the documents? What 
purpose do the documents serve? 
Requirements How do you handle the requirements for the software? Where do the requirements come 
from? What are the challenges? What are the advantages? 
Life cycle How do you work in iterations? How are they planned? Evaluated? How many 
interruptions are introduced during the iterations? What is your evaluation of working in 
iterations? 
Test How do you test the software? Who is responsible? What is your evaluation of the process 
of testing? 
 
 
Interview Guide, Phase 2 
Themes Questions 
Changes In what way have your work tasks changed since last time? What are the greatest changes 
that has happened since last time? What is your assessment of these changes? 
Organizing of 
people 
What changes have been made to the way people are organized? What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of these changes? 
Process Which changes have you implemented in your process? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of these changes? Which role do the regulatory requirements play? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this process? How do you evaluate this process? 
Agile Which changes have been made to: The planning meetings? The stand-up meetings? The 
demo and retrospectives? The roles: scrum master, product owner?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of these changes? 
Regulations Which boundaries do the regulatory requirements give?  
How do the regulatory requirements affect the way you run Scrum?  
Documentation Writing documents, which role have that played since last time? Which documents have 
you been working on? Who was responsible? What purpose have those played? 
Requirements Have you made any changes to how the requirements are handled? Changes to the 
requirements specifications? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these changes? 
Life cycle Have you made any changes to the iterations? The length? How are they planned? 
Evaluated? Do you still experience several interruptions in each iteration? What is your 
evaluation of working in iterations? 
Test Have you made any changes to how the tests are handled? When is the software tested? 
Who is responsible? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these changes? 
 
 
 
